The balance between free expression and its regulation is best illustrated through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which domesticated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law. Section 12(4) of the HRA compels courts to give “particular regard” to the value of freedom of expression, reflecting Parliament’s intention to guard speech rights—especially within public interest contexts. However, this provision also reveals a long-standing tension in UK law: how to preserve free expression without enabling harm or discrimination.

Legal Framework

The laws surrounding the regulation of speech within the UK are overarchingly governed by Article 10 of the ECHR. Article 10 is a qualified right declaring that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. Paragraph 2 of the Article, however, illustrates how the right is qualified; there may be conditions or restrictions as are prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society, and in pursuit of a legitimate aim.

Paragraph 2 is important. Article 10 does not confer an absolute right, unlike some of the rights conferred in earlier Articles (c.f. Article 2 and Article 3). This means that individuals’ right to freedom of expression can be interfered with in certain situations, notably when said expression interferes with the rights and liberties of others.

This dichotomy is what poses the greatest legislative challenge to lawmakers, and explains why the discourse surrounding free speech has become so controversial.

Acts of Parliament provide further limitations on the exercise of freedom of speech; Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989 provides for an offence for members or former members of the intelligence services to disclose information obtained by their service. In the political sphere, Section 321 of the Communications Act provides for a complete blanket ban against political advertising on broadcast media, a legislative move that has recieved unequivicol Parliamentary support, despite seemingly falling short of satisfying the proportionality requirement contained in Paragraph 2 of Article 10 (see: R(Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State).

The common law provides further guidance as to how questions about freedom of expression should be approached. Cases such as Handyside v United Kingdom contained useful dicta passed down from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), wherein the court highlighted how Article 10 extends to words that “offend, shock or disturb”.

Judicial Dicta

The right to freedom of expression occupies significant space in public discourse; thus, judicial dicta on the matter is plentiful. Lord Steyn in R v Home Secretary ex p Simms conveyed how freedom of speech is the “lifeblood of democracy”, further highlighting how the right acted as a “saftey valve” within society, due to the notion that people are more ready to accept opposing decisions when then can – in principle – seek to influence them through their exercise of freedom of expression.

Bingham further commented that modern democratic government was “government of the people, by the people, for the people”, adding that this notion cannot be satisfied but for the existence of free speech and unless the facts are “made known and publicly ventilated”. This sentiment appears to be widely held and is purportedly indicative of the significant appreciation afforded to the right by judges.

In Campbell v MGN (an authority discussed later in this article), Lady Hale distinguishes between different types of speech, stating that “top of the list is political speech”, further highlighting how “the free exchange of information and ideas on matters relevant to the country is crucial in any democracy”, adding, “without this, we can scarecly be called a democracy at all”.

Free Speech and Privacy

The legal framework seems clear enough, and significant judicial effort has gone into clarifying the importance and position of freedom of expression in the UK’s constitutional makeup. The challenges and controversies arise when balancing other rights within the convention. Most emblematic of this struggle is the balance between an individual’s right to privacy (ECHR Article 8) and an individual’s right to freedom of expression. This issue most commonly arises in matters regarding the media, and will be conveyed through three illustrative cases.

Campbell v MGN is the first of such cases, although perhaps the most distant about the balance between competing convention rights, because it was decided on common law grounds. On the facts, Campbell was photographed leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, whilst maintaining the public perception of non-narcotic use. The judgement handed down ruled in Campbell’s favour, expanding the old law of breach of confidence into a novel “reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine”. The decision to side with Campbell, however agreeable one might see it, came at a cost to the media’s right to freedom of expression.

In PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, the Supreme Court granted an injunction restraining the press from publishing details of a sexual relationship involving the claimant, a public figure. While the material was already available online internationally, the court upheld the injunction based on Article 8 (right to privacy), favouring the claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Lord Toulson’s dissent raised concerns about the chilling effect on the media and questioned whether the restriction satisfied the proportionality test under Article 10(2), echoing anxieties about overreach in privacy-based speech limitations.

A final, and perhaps the most significant authority, can be derived from Bloomberg v ZXC. The Supreme Court in 2022 heard the case, wherein Bloomberg (a serious and respected financial reporting agency) wanted to run a story about a serious international fraud investigation. ZXC was accused of serious financial malpractice and fraud, a notion that Bloomberg wanted to report to the public. The Supreme Court, however, unanimously ruled in favour of ZXC, stating that it had a right to a reasonable expectation of privacy up until the moment it was charged with an offence; the court thus granted an injunction, and prevented Bloomberg from running the story. The case was met with significant outward criticism, with influential lawyers such as Geoffrey Robertson KC publicly condemning the decision, labelling the “British tradition of free speech as a myth”.

Free Speech and Hate Speech

Politicians such as J.D. Vance have commented about the state of the UK’s freedom of speech in the media recently; however, statements to the effect that freedom of speech in the UK is dead seem misguided. The UK has concretised the right to freedom of expression both at the common law level and with its commitment to the ECHR. What the right does not confer, however, is a right to hate speech, or a right to interfere with the rights and liberties of others.

In a recent debate in the Cambridge University Union, Charlie Kirk referenced the case of Lucy Connolly in passing, who was imprisoned for 31 months after comments that she made online. The content of such comments was, quote: “Mass deportation now, set fire to all the fucking hotels full of the bastards for all I care … if that makes me racist, so be it”. The comment and others to the same effect are not protected under free speech laws in the UK. Connolly was convicted in Birmingham Crown Court, on the basis that her comments fell within the offence conferred in the Public Order Act, after she was deemed to have ‘stirred up racial hatred’.

On the other side of the political spectrum, freedom of speech does not extend to support of proscribed organisations. In contemporary news, arrests have been made for individuals advocating support for Palestine Action, a now proscribed organisation for the purpose of the Terrorism Act 2000. Whether this proscription was appropriate can again be debated; however, the legal position provides for a clear limitation on the extent of free speech.

Conclusion

In summation, the longstanding tradition of free speech in the UK remains strong; however, any conception that the right is absolute is misguided. The question as to whether the UK does possess genuine free speech is a matter for semantics.